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Article 3

NOTRE DAME LAW SCHOOL CIVIL RIGHTS LECTURES
R. Sargent Shriverk
I. Introduction
I approach this opportunity to deliver the "Civil Rights-Human Rights
Lectures" at Notre Dame with humility and misgiving. Misgiving because others
are much more qualified by experience and erudition, humility because of the
great jurist who inaugurated this lecture series only two years ago-Chief Justice
Earl Warren. Not Martin Luther King nor John F. Kennedy nor Lyndon
Johnson surpasses Earl Warren in his preeminent place in the history of civil
rights in America. To be associated, even as a successor lecturer, with such a
historic figure is an honor, but that honor brings heavy responsibilities to maintain the quality of these lectures. Of that burden I am acutely conscious as I
speak to you tonight.
Yet, despite my inadequacies for this task, I am joyful to be speaking at
this moment and in this place on the subject and challenge of civil and human
rights. It is a fitting moment because this year marks the twentieth anniversary
of Earl Warren's historic ruling on behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court that
equality before the law forbids segregation in the schools, that the bitter heritage
of slavery should not enslave another generation.
The place, too, is fitting. First, because Notre Dame's President, the Rev.
Theodore M. Hesburgh, in whose honor these lectures are held, has lived the
full mission of a Christian vocation in the cause of civil rights: he has been a
minister to the nation and has made God's work here on earth truly his own.
As the Chairman of the Civil Rights Commission, Father Hesburgh was a conscience for us all. Because he used his power in the pursuit of justice, men who
abused theirs could not abide him. But we value him for the truth he teaches,
not for the title he had, just as he has valued principle more than any office in
the land.
It is also fitting that these civil rights lectures are an annual event at Notre
Dame. When others grow weary, you have a responsibility to stay strong. While
others surrender, you must continue to resist. For as William Stringfellow rethe vocation to oppose and transcend the power of death, the
minds us, "...
calling to live humanly in the midst of death ... is unceasing and incessant.
That resistance goes on wherever human beings truly esteem the gift of their
own humanity, which at the same time means . . . wherever human beings
esteem the word of God."1 Notre Dame was founded and flourishes on the
word of God. Of all the work given to this world and taken up here, none is
* Partner, law firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman. B.A., Yale, 1938;
LL.B., 1941. Director, Peace Corps, 1961-1966. Director, Office of Economic Opportunity,
1964-1968. United States Ambassador to France, 1968-1970.
In the preparation of this lecture, I wish to acknowledge the significant assistance of
several close friends who are also experts on the matters I discuss. I am deeply grateful to
each of them: John Buggs, Reverend J. Bryan Hehir, Harry Kranz, and Robert Shrum.
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more important than civil rights, for whatever we do to the least of our brethren,
we do unto Him.2
II. The Nature of the Question
While it would be proper and productive to take as my task the history of
civil rights since 1954, counting the successes and recalling the setbacks, I have
chosen instead to broaden the theme, to expand its scope, and to explore the
larger implications. I propose in these lectures, first, to examine the relationship
between civil and human rights, domestically and internationally and, second,
to look not to the distance we have come already but to the miles we must go
befbre we can sleep.
I take this approach because all the experiences of my life, especially my
most recent activities, persuade me that no other approach can succeed. Those
who have lived during recent decades, from the legally segregated society of
the twenties, thirties, and forties, into the dawn of the enlightenment of the
fifties and sixties, and who now witness the renewed negations, realize that civil
and human rights will not be established or maintained in this land, or in our
world, unless we can establish an ethical and moral understanding of man and
his destiny, clear and strong enough to sustain a universal, not only a domestic,
effort for justice. Nothing less can succeed.
Campaigning for the Vice-Presidency proved to me that only universal
values and total honesty can bring the Wallace supporters of Alabama together
with the liberals on the West Side of New York City.
Visiting the Soviet Union eight times in the last twelve months convinced
me that only universal values and total honesty can match the intelligence and
courage of Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn or speak across the seeming void between
communism and capitalism.
Traveling the world for the Peace Corps and seeing want in America during
the war against poverty convinced me that only universal values and total honesty
can touch poor and rich alike within our own country.
Thus, we must always recall and remember that what we call civil rights
in America is part of a broader category of human rights which must apply
everywhere in the world. While it is important to recognize the legitimate distinction between the whole and its American part, we must at the same time
see and understand them together. Human and civil rights are philosophically
related: Our conception of civil rights flows from deeper conceptions of the
nature of man and society, the same sources for our conception of human rights.
They are politically related: If the United States is to stand as an advocate of
human rights abroad, as I think it must, then we must champion civil rights at
home. Finally, they are problematicallyrelated: A series of emerging issues cuts
across the traditional distinctions between domestic and foreign policy. Indeed,
we now face practical, transnational problems which empirically witness the
insights which poets and philosophers have expressed for centuries about the
unity of the human family, its solidarity, and its single destiny.
2
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Initially, therefore, we must establish a framework for the discussion of
human and civil rights questions by examining the problems we face and probing
the philosophic foundations of those problems. Without such philosophic foundations, we cannot deal with the dimensions of the issues, domestically or internationally. We need to know where we stand intellectually and morally before
we can decide where we want to go and how we are going to get there.
I will argue that the human rights philosophical tradition needs to be
expanded in scope, refined in structural articulation, and then applied within
the policy-making process of our government both domestically and internationally. I begin with a reaffirmation of the basic elements of this tradition.
At the heart of a human rights view of society stands the concept of the
person, a spiritual being set apart from the rest of creation with a capacity for
thought, generosity, friendship, and love. The unique nature of the person
means that he or she is possessed of a spectrum of rights, moral claims which
can be asserted to defend personality, property, and privacy and enhance his or
her human potential. Without rights, human dignity is vulnerable to attack
from both the organized powers of the state and the disorganized chaos into
which human relationships deteriorate when the values of personhood no longer
command our respect.
In order for human rights to be respected, however, it is necessary that
the concept of the person be supplemented with a certain vision of society as a
community, not as a crowd or a mass. The human rights philosophy assumes
an interdependence of persons and an interrelationship of rights existing in such
a society. This view requires that we be responsible for one another and to one
another. The basis of this responsibility is the bond of solidarity existing between
all of us who share human existence. Recognition of our mutual responsibility
and realization of our common bonds are the basic elements of our interdependence. Implicit in this concept of interdependence is the idea of an interrelationship of rights-that the security of the rights of each is dependent upon the
protection of the rights of all.
Both of these ideas-that we are responsible to one another and share a
common destiny and that human dignity is not a divisible concept but one which
must be protected as a universal value if it is to be possessed as an individual
attribute-are the essential elements of a human rights view of society. It is the
implication of these ideas in contemporary issues which I intend to explore in
these lectures.
Domestically, we have seen in recent years the relationship of philosophical
ideals and practical application in the luminous example of Martin Luther
King. Above all else, he showed us ourselves as we truly are. He nonviolently
forced America to confront what Gunnar Myrdal described a third of a century
ago as our dilemma-the dichotomy between the philosophical and religious
ideals we espouse as a nation and the social and legal practices we tolerate in
our daily existence.' Like Lincoln a century earlier, Martin Luther King invoked
the values of the ideal America to move the conscience of the real America, and
an informed conscience reformed society. This fusion of philosophy and politics
3
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in the civil rights struggle of the 1960s was an important landmark. It is now
an important learning experience for us as we respond to the issues of the 1970s
and the 1980s.
The results of the civil rights movement of the 1960s were built upon the
Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown u. Board of Education.' As Brown
constituted the decisive step in the judicial order, so the 1960s constituted the
decisive period for legislative action. However, the momentum of the last decade
has slowed and in some areas even reversed. Broad segments of our society are
apathetic. Others are exhausted. Many are left not with a commitment to
justice but with the sense that enough or too much has been done, that more
can be achieved only at the expense of their own interests. On the other hand,
the momentum of past legislative accomplishments has taken us perhaps as far
as the law alone can go. The challenge of the 1970s is more in the political
order, less in law-making endeavor. The pressing need today in civil rights is
for leadership, not legislation. We must muster the political will to implement
the design we legislated in the struggle of the 1960s. And this calls for much
more than a supine policy of "benign neglect."' It calls upon those in leadership
to think problems through and to have the courage to reorder their thinking
not only about the inherent philosophical value of individual human beings but
also about their potential to contribute to society as a whole. It requires that
stereotypical responses to the question of minority participation in decision-making be discarded in favor of reasoned recognition of individual talents and
desires. It requires that each and every man and woman develop a philosophy
of humanity which ignores all external bases for differentiation (race, sex, etc.)
and focuses on individual merits. This approach proved successful when the
Peace Corps, Office of Economic Opportunity, and War Against Poverty were
being organized and staffed, and there is no reason to suspect that it would not
succeed today.
Perhaps the unique aspect of our day in terms of the demands it places
upon us and the possibilities it opens to us is the need to include in our normative
vision of civil and human rights not only domestic but also international questions. As we extend our scope from the national entity to the international
arena, as we expand our charge to the human rights of which civil rights are
a part, we find that the problems are more complex; the structures for dealing
with them are rudimentary or nonexistent; and the will to confront them is
weaker still. Yet a proposal to think in more than national terms is not a philosophical ideal or a utopian idea. It is a necessity. Anything other than an
international conception of society is an inadequate and ineffective frame of
reference, even for dealing with domestic issues.
The essence of our dilemma is that we live in a world of transnational
problems which is still organized and controlled on the basis of the nation-state.
I have no illusions about the international system being radically transformed
overnight. But to say this is not to dismiss our urgent need for a common con4
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ceptual framework to organize a world which has changed faster than our capacity to understand it intellectually, psychologically, politically, or ethically.
The basic strategic reality of the international system is the fact of nuclear
deterrent, the mutual death risk in which the superpowers possess the power to
destroy people on every side. Traditional notions of defense are obsolete. The
idea that a sovereign state can defend its borders and protect its population from
attack is not the operative idea of deterrence. Rather, each side depends upon
the shared knowledge that in any major conflict, the citizens and the society of
both would be destroyed. Without a shared conception among adversaries, this
system will not function.
Economically, the same interdependence is evident. No developed nation
can stand alone amid the complex web of existing monetary and trade arrangements. Obviously, the economic system does not exhibit a high degree of reciprocal dependence. Instead it is grievously distorted, with islands of affluence
in a vast sea of poverty and misery. Yet even here, despite the disparities of
power and wealth, a model of interdependence is a more accurate reflection of
world realities than a picture of autonomous sovereign units, each in absolute
control of its own destiny.
Demographically and socially, the same interdependence appears. The
population problem, the emigration problem, and the race problem all defy
national borders and cannot be solved by national means. Finally, the most visible
transnational issue is probably environmental pollution. No nation can save itself
from the effects of environmental damage; only a concerted effort by all can
secure clean air and water.
These problems, of course, are more complex than any brief mention can
reveal. Yet even without further analysis, they highlight the transnational process at work on this planet. Transnational dynamics, supplemented by global
communications systems and technology transfers, are creating a world physically
more compressed every day. Yet the fact of material interdependence, created
either by economic relationships, communications systems, or technological
bonds, does not and cannot inevitably produce an awareness of human or moral
interdependence. The transition from material to moral interdependence demands a consensus in society of how we ought to organize our interdependence
and how we should share its benefits and distribute its burdens equitably at
the national or international level. The conceptual problem we face today is
how we can draw upon the accumulated wisdom contained in the human rights
tradition to provide a moral framework for our material interdependence. The
pressing need for such a philosophical or moral framework derives from the fact
that material interdependence is by itself an ambiguous reality: It can push us
together in a crowd competing for limited resources or it can be a means of
calling us together in a community bound by acknowledged ties of responsibility.
The margin of difference between those two options will be determined by
whether we can establish a rationale for interdependence as a chosen way of
life, nationally and internationally, rather than an imposed fate created by
technology and media.
Yet today, clearly, there is no international moral, political, or philosophical
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unity. Thus we find ourselves incapable of solving the problems we face. Energy,
population, food, money, jobs, trade, and even health defy solution. If we act
alone, we have no more than a marginal possibility of protecting human rights
and distributing human resources in a just manner.
In light of these two broadly drawn agenda, one domestic, the other international, we come to the question: What philosophical foundation is necessary?
What shared vision of society, what criteria for distributing benefits and burdens,
what senses of personal responsibility and professional vocation are required to
solve these transnational problems? And what is their relationship to civil rights
and human rights?
These questions are beyond the capacity of any one person to answer and
may not admit of any final answer; but we can point towards certain criteria
which may open approaches to a shared vision. The two criteria or test questions I propose to examine concern, first, the scope which our concern for these
rights must encompass and, second, the structure or logic of the moral argument
supporting civil and human rights.
If the rationale for interdependence is to be worthy of the human dignity
which is the moral basis of our life and society, then such a rationale must be
rooted in the human rights conception. A human rights conception both
broadens the scope of the moral vision of society to a transnational range and
provides a multidimensional structure of moral discourse for a diverse range of
problems. The scope of our sense of moral responsibility, that is to say, how far
our sense of responsibility extends and to whom we extend it, is a fundamental
moral and political issue. The reason for its preeminence at this point reflects
the factual situation I described earlier: We live in a world of transnational
problems but operate in nation-states in which national interest functions as
the primary moral and political category. In this framework, the legitimate but
limited concept of national interest assumes a position and a weight out of
proportion to its value and validity.
The national interest model of moral responsibility tends to see reality
through the prism of power, while an alternative model would offer a vision of
how society should be rather than how it is. It would seek to direct and control
the de facto uses of power by the de jure norms of principle. Both power and
principle are part of the organization of any social structure. The question
which the civil and human rights tradition has always raised and with which
we must grapple today on a scale never previously equalled is this: Which has
priority, power or principle? Do we shape principle to fit existing power realities
or shall we strive to direct power through principles? Although this is not a new
question, it has taken on a new significance and urgency in our age. Romano
Guardini argued twenty years ago that the struggle between power and principle
would be the distinguishing mark of our time. As Guardini puts it, the basic
challenge is whether we can develop the moral capacity to control and direct
the power we have created.6 This phrasing of the challenge takes seriously the
reality of power but refuses to let us live comfortably with a society formed
6 See generally R. GUARDINI,
1961).
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solely by the exigencies of political, military, scientific, or technological power.
The contention between power and principle is central to the theme of
interdependence and to all questions of civil and human rights. How shall we
determine the scope of our responsibility in an interdependent world, through
the perceived requirements of power or the perceived demands of principle?
The choice becomes more critical each day as we recognize more and more a
common reliance on the same resources in a world whose resources are finite
and rapidly being depleted. The energy crisis has given Americans our first
experience with shortages of a commodity we consider a basic necessity. The
fact of interdependence points us toward the correlative fact of limited economic
and natural resources, but neither fact provides a sufficient framework for reflection. We must move from the material and economic order to the level of politics
and finally to the level of ethics or moral reflection if we are to make sense out
of the recent, perhaps passing, but clearly prophetic episode of energy shortfalls.
The transition from economics to politics requires a change in vocabulary
and concepts. Instead of material shortages we must speak of the politics of
scarcity. The politics of scarcity assumes limited resources as a fact of future
existence. It challenges us to order our society so that it may confront scarcity
as a universal fact of life, not the particular fate of the poor. The technical
debate here is immensely complicated. Rather than pursuing it to a pointless
extreme, I would point out that simply raising the political question-how do we
order our life together-forces us to the highest level of political discourse,
where politics passes into the realm of ethics. The question of social organization
demands as a precondition to any answer that we address another, more fundamental question: By what norm shall we judge our success or failure? What
shall our standard be? It is a short trip from the long line at the local gas
station to the basic moral issue. As material shortages translate into economic
facts, they provoke questions about political processes which in turn are dependent upon moral principles.
The choice of power or principle as an organizing precept will produce
very different concepts of moral responsibility and quite different consequences
for society. The direct relationship between policy decisions in one part of the
globe and consequences in another is the most striking moral attribute of our
interdependence. Perhaps it is true that some such relationship always existed
in the human community, but today two factors distinguish our situation from
the past: First, the bonds of the relationship are more direct and its impact
more immediate. Second, we now know, if we care to look, listen, and investigate, how responsible we are for one another. In the face of this knowledge,
we can continue to invoke inadequate concepts, to base policy decisions primarily
on self-interest, and to ignore the situation. But then we cannot deny our guilt.
To understand the consequences of our action wipes away the last shield which
guards our innocence. We cannot know the results of our actions and remain
without responsibility.
Nothing puts the choice between power and principle more vividly than the
question of food, hunger, and consumption-a dilemma which has acquired
surprising force and immediacy in the past two years. Food is a typically trans-
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national problem for our nationally organized global system. It is a prismatic
example of the resource-consumption-population matrix at the heart of the
energy crisis and raises the fundamental moral dilemma of starvation versus
affluence. For all these reasons I have taken the food question as a test case to
think through and illuminate the scope of our moral responsibility in an interdependent world and as a means to ascertain where we stand, where we must
go, and why, with respect to questions of civil and human rights.
We are in the midst of a transnational food crisis more terrifying and important than the energy crisis. Its seriousness is manifest not merely in the
tragic outbreaks of famine in the sub-Saharan African nations and in India
and Bangladesh,' but in the rising prices on the international market for principal food commodities such as wheat, rice, feed-grains, and soybeans. There
have been poor rice harvests in Asia,' a short fall in the Soviet wheat crop,9
and for two consecutive years a drought of anchovetta off the coast of Peru.'
In an effort to control rising domestic food prices, the United States in the
summer of 1973 announced restrictions on the export of soybeans and related
foodstuffs.
Since the grim predictions of Malthus, a relationship between rising population and declining food resources has been a recurrent worry. More and more
mouths to feed due to rapid population growth is of course a continual challenge
to any nation. But an added challenge is the insatiable affluence which pressures
world food resources. Here a startling picture of disproportionate consumption
appears. This disproportion is typified by grain consumption, which accounts
for more than 70 percent of the world's crop area. 1 Grain consumed directly
provides 52 percent of our food energy supply. 2 Agricultural economist Lester
Brown notes:
In the poor countries the annual availability of grain per person averages
only about 400 pounds per year. Nearly all of this small amount must be
consumed directly to meet minimum energy needs. Little can be spared for
conversion into animal protein. In the United States and Canada, per
capita grain utilization is currently approaching 1 ton per year. Of this
total only about 150 pounds are consumed directly in the form of bread,
pastries, and breakfast cereals. The remainder is consumed indirectly in
the form of meat, milk, and eggs. The agricultural resources-land, water,
fertilizer-required to support an average North American 13are nearly five
times those of the average Indian, Nigerian, or Colombian.
The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations periodically
issues reports which warn that one-third to one-half of the world's population
is ill-fed-undernourished because they do not consume enough calories or mal7 See Henriot, Global Population in Perspective: Implications for U.S. Policy Response,
35 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 48, 63 (1974-) [hereinafter cited as Global Population in Perspective].
8 Id. at 63.

9
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10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 64.
13 Id.; BROWN, POPULATION AND AFFLUENCE: GROWING PRESSURES ON WORLD FOOD
RESOURCES 7 (Overseas Development Council, Development Paper No. 15, Washington,
D.C. 1973).
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nourished because their diet is protein deficient. 4 Since the mid-1940s, protein
content has increased six percent in the diets of people in the developed countries
and decreased six percent in the diets of people in the developing countries 5
Total protein supply per capita in the United States, Canada, France, Australia,
and New Zealand is approximately 100 grams per day."8 In India, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and many parts of Africa and Latin America, it is only half as
7

much..

Although the so-called Green Revolution has brought considerable hope,
it is not without serious difficulties. The development of special strains of corn,
wheat, and beans has multiplied the food supply of the developing world. But
several barriers bound that multiplication: (1) cultivated land suitable for
high-yield seeds is becoming scarce; (2) intensive chemical fertilizers pose ecological dangers and their supply is now threatened by the energy crisis; and (3)
the displacement of small farmers increases unemployment and aggravates problems of urbanization.
If they are rationally managed, the oceans offer extensive opportunities for
harvesting food. But rational management has thus far been a prescription,
not a practice. The result has been overfishing that defeats its own purpose as
world fish supply and catch continue to stagnate or decline.
Because rising population and rising affluence are straining the world's
food supply just as finite limits on food production are becoming a reality, the
question of distribution is more and more critical. The attention this question
will receive depends upon the moral vision underpinning our view of society.
The wide contrast in food consumption between the developing nations and
the developed nations poses a typical transnational moral challenge.
There is another dimension to the food crisis which is equally important
to an understanding of the demands of our interdependence and the choices
which it places before us. We are not only the principal consumer of food in
the world but the principal supplier of food for the rest of the world. Some
sense of the significance of our position is conveyed by the fact that the United
States and Canada today control a larger share of the world's exportable supplies of grain than the Middle East does of oil. In an interdependent world,
what is the nature and scope of the responsibility which comes with this position? Is President Nixon's proposed Project Independence 8 a responsive policy
or an irresponsible anachronism? Are we to hoard food now to guard against
some potential future American famine?
One answer is that we should determine how we exercise our power as a
supplier in a seller's market according to the demands of our national interest
alone. This proposition is neither wholly invalid nor irrelevant, but I think it
important to ask whether it is adequate any longer. Such reliance on calculations
of self-interest would result in decisions which most of us and millions of others
14
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in this country and abroad would regard as not only politically dangerous but
morally reprehensible. Yet this is precisely what happened last spring when we
imposed export controls on soybeans and other foodstuffs for the purpose of
controlling domestic inflation. From our point of view, this was an understandable response. In the classic moral dispensation, there is a duty to care for those
closest to us before turning to others far away. Yet from another point of view,
namely the demands of interdependence and the fact that we exercise considerable control over an essential commodity, the consumption of which cannot be
postponed simply by choice, the decision set a precedent in the international
system which could turn interdependence into a continuing power struggle of
frightening proportions. The immediate effect of our action was to intensify
inflationary pressures on food prices in other parts of the world. This caused
resentment even in the developed nations, where starvation is not yet a problem.
But if we are really to assess the impact of our adjudication of our domestic needs
against international needs, we should heed the following comment about the
impact of rising food prices on the poorest countries of the world:
When one spends about 80 percent of one's income on food, as a sizeable
segment of mankind does today, a doubling in the price of wheat or rice
cannot possibly be met by increased food expenditures. It can only drive a
subsistence diet below the subsistence or survival level. Today's wheat
prices of $5.00 per bushel will without doubt be reflected in higher death
rates in many poor nations in the months ahead. 9
In an interdependent world forced to live with the politics of scarcity, such
stark moral trade-offs between the essential needs of some and the preferences
of others will continue to be with us. A human rights view of adjudicating these
needs and choices calls upon us to adopt a very specific definition of the community for which we are responsible and to which each of us stands accountable.
That view of the concept of the community in turn is based on how we evaluate
the role, place, and significance of the person in the political process.
In the national interest framework, the nation-state and the national community have a unique significance in the formulation of policy and the evaluation
of duty to the larger international community. Interdependence as a material
fact may complicate the implementation of policy, but it does not change the
hierarchy of value in its formulation. The national community is seen as having
an ultimate and overriding value in the disposition of any issue. Given that
judgment, the nation-state may then balance relative domestic needs against absolute foreign needs and still decide in favor of the domestic needs. The scope of
responsibility determines the scale of priorities. In this matrix of evaluation,
to impose export controls on essential commodities, even though an absolute
need exists for them abroad, is a sound judgment. If one has the power and if
one's assessment of the national interest ranks relative domestic need over
absolute international need, then power should be used to protect the national
interest. A human rights view of the organization of society would yield a different standard. It refuses the status of absolute or ultimate value to any national
19
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entity in an interdependent world. It asserts instead a moral premise of universal
community even if that community is flawed because it is without public authority to meet the basic needs of the human family. Thus, the human rights
view posits an existing community even in the absence of a fully organized
society because this view assigns weight and value to the individual person in
political society. The human rights view is superior to existing norms and practices precisely because it accords the kind of ultimate status to the person which
the national interest view accords to the nation-state. The human rights tradition is rooted in the proposition that the person is the foundation for the political
process. So each system of political organization must be tested by how well it
protects the dignity of the person and whether it adequately fulfills the rights of
the person. And we speak of rights, not privileges-rights which belong to persons solely by virtue of their status as human beings.
This view of the value of the person and his or her significance in the
political process is very much part of our own political heritage as a country.
The legitimate criticism can be made that America's assessment of rights has
been cast more in political than in social or economic terms, but the ideal of
judging the political process according to its contribution to the rights and dignity of the person is central to our constitutional system and to the civil rights
struggle. The extension of this insight from civil rights to the worldwide human
rights which include civil rights is what our interdependence now demands.
The primacy of the person in the civil rights tradition lays the foundation for
such a transition. It argues, I think, that the ultimate community to which we
owe responsibility is the community of all those who possess human dignity. It
asserts that within the confines of that ultimate community, in an interdependent
world of a limited supply of basic resources, the total community has an obligation to satisfy the fundamental needs of each person before satisfying the
acquired tastes of some people. Hence in this model, starvation outside the
nation-state takes precedence over a disagreeable but tolerable inflation within
the nation-state. The international order is not yet shaped to such a standard,
but this is precisely where the moral tradition of the higher law functions. It
seeks to bridge the gap by questioning existing organizations and by asserting
a sense of moral responsibility even where legal and political norms are still
lacking.
In the case at hand, a concept of moral responsibility suggests, among other
things, the creation of a common grain reserve upon which nations could lay
claim, not in the first instance because they have the power to make demands
on other nations or because they have the finances to bargain in the open market,
but because they have people who share our human dignity and who must
depend for a time upon our sense of human responsibility to sustain their existence at a tolerable level.
Only such a sense of responsibility can transform mere material interdependence into true moral interdependence. Instead of attending to ourselves alone
or to our own country, we must place a unique, uncompromising value on the
person in a political process which today is dominated by power realities. At
the same time, we must clarify the structural relationship among categories of

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[October 1974]

human rights. There is a moral logic to the human rights tradition which
envisions not a random selection of isolated rights, but an intrinsically related
spectrum of rights, rooted in the dignity of the person, shaped to protect and
enhance that dignity across the entire human life cycle. The spectrum of rights
must exist first in the moral order, but it must also be translated into the legal
and political order so that moral claims are explicit, institutionalized and subject
to effective adjudication.
Yet at this moment in the United States, twenty years after Brown and
twenty-five years after the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, we
seem to have a weaker grasp on the moral logic of the human rights tradition
than at any time in the American past. It is difficult to determine precisely the
source of the confusion-whether it is our incomprehension of the basic moral
arguments for a human rights philosophy or whether it is an understandable
perplexity about how the tradition relates to new issues and to old issues sharpened to a new intensity in the context of interdependency. Whatever the cause,
the result is clear. We have no consistent appreciation or application of a human
rights philosophy to public policy. The absence of an integrated view leads to
selective perception of human rights issues which arise in the political or legal
order. Different issues call forth different constituencies, and in any attempt to
relate the defense of one right to the defense of another, discussion among the
various constituencies resembles a dialogue of the deaf.
The lack of a coherent philosophy of rights, of a consensus on the theory of
rights, whether among philosophers, political leaders or the people, is not an
aesthetic or esoteric concern. The discordance resonates in the public forum as
issues are debated and the human rights debate itself becomes "politicized" at
the very time when it should be "philosophized."
The need for a renewal of the human rights tradition is especially apparent
in three major areas of public concern.
First, the cornerstone of the human rights tradition in our constitutiona
system has been the protection of liberty in the political or civil order. We have
sought to protect the individual from the unwarranted intrusion of state power.
This issue has commanded more philosophical and jurisprudential reflection in
American scholarship than any other element in the spectrum of human rights.
Now the experience of Watergate has revealed the strength of the threat to
individual political rights which is inherent in the modem bureaucratic state.
Leadership is armed with sophisticated technological means of surveillance,
unrestrained by private conscience or public duty, and ready to invoke illdefined notions of national security to use and abuse power for undemocratic
purposes. The immediate consequences of Watergate obviously need to be
settled in the Congress and the courts. All of us will watch the process closely,
but hopefully none of us will lose sight of the larger issue. We must move from
fascination with the scandal to an examination of the fundamental question it
raises: How can we secure individual freedom within a complex, modern state?
A second area where lack of philosophical or moral agreement impedes our
progress is the social and economic rights of the person. The very strength of
the American commitment to political rights has tended to distract us from the
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task of articulating a charter of socioeconomic rights which would guarantee
to all a minimum level of economic welfare. Yet it is precisely this area of rights
which both the civil rights movement of the 1960s and the War Against Poverty
have forced to the forefront of our public debate. The quality of that debate,
reflected in discussions of welfare, income maintenance, tax reform, full employment, and comprehensive health care, reveals a profound dissonance in the
moral philosophy of the nation. In the political or civil order we speak easily
of rights-of the moral claims a person has on society-but in the socioeconomic
order we rarely speak of claims a person can assert, even for basic necessities.
We talk of favors which the poor can beg. We need a moral consensus about
socioeconomic rights as a prerequisite to decisive action at the political or legal
level.
Finally, the most recent and potentially far-reaching challenge posed to the
human rights tradition has emerged in the area of biology, genetics, and their
attendant technologies. The cracking of the genetic code, the experiments with
in vitro fertilization, new developments in medical technology, the capabilities
to sustain life mechanically far below the point where life support systems function spontaneously"-all these raise fundamental issues about the beginnings of
human life and its termination. Guardini's 0 question about the relationship of
principle and power is now put to us by the biological revolution as urgently as
it was after World War II by the nuclear revolution. By what conception of
human rights and social morality will we direct and control the far-reaching
authority we have acquired over life and death? We are only starting to develop
a conceptual framework to apply human rights considerations to some issues.
Other issues, like human experimentation and problems of death and dying,
have been probed in previous ages, but they reappear today in the new forms of
advanced technology.
Already we see a division in the moral discussion of such questions. Fundamentally, it is a split between those who give human life itself primacy in their
ethical judgments and those who emphasize the quality of life. This dichotomy,
manifest in discussions of population policy, abortion, and death and dying,
has several subtle dimensions. Even a cursory exploration of the different positions and their public policy implications clearly reveals the phenomenon of
selective preception in the area of civil and human rights. On the philosophical
level, the quality-of-life argument is used against the right-to-life argument. On
the practical level, right-to-life constituencies, while deeply and legitimately
concerned about the human right of a fetus, seem less interested in quality-oflife questions like civil or socioeconomic rights. Conversely, in the past decade
we have seen constituencies profoundly committed to the stopping of the destruction of innocent life in Vietnam or even the life of a criminal by capital punishment, while the same constituencies were unmoved by the taking of human life
through liberalized abortion legislation.
Such selective perception points to the structural questions of the human
rights tradition. The need is for an aggiornamentoof moral logic to expand and
20 See generally R. GuARDiNi, POWER AND RESPONSmILITY (16t ed. E. Briefs transi.
1961).
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refine the content of the human rights argument in a way which relates it viably
and creatively to pressing political, socioeconomic, military, biomedical, and
transnational issues.
I have taken some care to point out that this is a need of the moment. It
has not yet been met satisfactorily and it certainly is not the work of one man.
It is a task for a generation. What we need is an integrated view of human
rights, held not simply by specialists or academicians or jurists, but by a consensus of the people. Human rights are secure only in a society where they are
the living faith of the electorate, not the esoteric formulations of an elite. A
systematic view of human rights must be consistent in structure and comprehensive in scope. The comprehension must include the entire spectrum of rights
from womb to tomb. Such a systematic view has the possibility of making a
value-of-life ethic and a quality-of-life ethic complementary, not antagonistic.
This is the theme which we must explore in search of a coherent structural view
of human rights.
III. The Civil Rights Challenge
Thus far I have examined broad philosophical questions of human rights
from a global perspective. Denial of civil rights in the United States provides a
more tangible setting for such discussion.
There is economic apartheid in America. In 1969, Blacks owned approximately 163,000 businesses which grossed $4.5 billion. Thus, although they
represent approximately 13 percent of the population and 11.3 percent of
the work force, Blacks own but 2/1 Oths of one percent of the nearly 7.5 million
U.S. businesses and gross less than 5/10ths of one percent of the Gross National
Product.2
The unemployment rate is twice as high for Blacks and other minorities as
for Whites, while members of minority groups who are employed occupy the
lowest paying jobs. There are massive disparities between the median incomes
of Whites, Blacks, and Spanish. In 1970, the typical black worker earned $4,000
less than the typical white worker. The Spanish-surnamed worker earned $3,000
lessY In 1960, black families earned 54 percent of what white families earned.
By 1966 the figure had risen to 58 percent and by 1970 to 60 percent, 2 but
regional differences tend to distort the significance of these averages.
There is housing apartheid in America. Minorities, particularly Blacks,
have been largely excluded from the development of the suburbs. This exclusion
is primarily the product of explicit discrimination in the sale and rental of
housing and is perpetuated by both racial and economic bias. Private real estate
practices reinforce the existing dual housing market. Financial institutions have
discouraged integrated community development both by restrictive practices
and by a lack of affirmative programs. The home building industry, for the
21 See REPORT OF THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT: MINORITY OWNED BUSINESSES:
1969-72 (1973).
22 United States Commission on Civil Rights, Twenty Years after Brown, 1974 (unpublished report).
23 Id.
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most part, has not made an attempt to market housing in a nondiscriminatory
manner, and many employers have failed to consider the effect of corporate site
selection upon low and moderate income employees.
Suburban governments have acted almost exclusively in their own economic
interest, often to the detriment of the central city and the metropolitan area as
a whole. Such devices as exclusionary zoning, failure to enact or enforce fair
housing ordinances, and failure to utilize federal housing assistance programs
have become widespread devices for preserving insular suburban interests.
The federal government has also perpetuated housing apartheid by failing
to enforce fair housing laws. The Department of Justice has been handicapped
by inadequate staffing and has spumed an active role in coordinating Title VI
enforcement among federal agencies. The Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) has been similarly understaffed and has confined its activities to answering complaints. Until recently, it did not conduct systematic
reviews of HUD-funded programs for compliance with Title VI. Finally, HUD
has not shaped its own programs to promote fair housing, despite the mandate
of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
This housing apartheid is illustrative of and contributes to the process of
racial polarization. The movement of the affluent white population to the
perimeters of metropolitan areas has resulted in the creation of the so-called
"white nooses" which now mark the point at which cities end and suburbia
begins. It also has prompted a movement of business and industry away from
the central city, which frequently deprives minorities of job opportunities available in theory but inaccessible in fact. Suburbanization has also drained urban
economic resources and thereby crippled urban school financing. It has supported the growth of racially segregated school systems before and since the
country was commanded to integrate with "....

all deliberate speed." 24 Finally,

because most of the new housing has been constructed in suburban areas, the
exclusion of minorities from the suburbs diminishes their housing alternatives
and often forces them to live in substandard inner-city housing.
There is apartheid in American justice. One measure of the quality of
justice is the equality of its administration. Yet wherever they live in significant
numbers, members of minority groups always comprise a percentage of the
prison population far in excess of their percentage of the total population. In
our federal prisons, for example, Spanish-surnamed persons comprise more than
18 percent of the prison population, although they comprise little more than six
percent of our total population.25 American Indians in the Southwest are victims of a similar disproportion. Similarly, in August 1973, 31 percent of all
prisoners in federal institutions were black, yet Blacks constitute but 13 percent
of the national population. 26 Proponents of the argument that certain racial
groups are inherently inferior have a ready explanation: No injustice is involved, no civil rights have been abrogated-it is just that the Spanish
Americans, Indians and Blacks are prone to criminal behavior. You and I know
24

25
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See Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) [hereinafter, Brown I1].
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this is not true. They are there in such numbers because America has offered
many of them few alternatives but those which lead to what we know as a life
of crime. All too often discrimination, subtle and overt, sophisticated and blatant, is their birthright.
Finally, there is educational apartheid in America. Our schools, where the
struggle for human rights has often focused, are still battlegrounds. In Brown
the Supreme Court concluded that "in the field of public education the doctrine
of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal."2 7 Further:
[T]o separate [black students] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community 2that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
8
ever to be undone.
With regard to the pace of integration, the Court in Brown II said that district
courts should implement desegregation "with all deliberate speed,"29 and commented that limited delays in achieving complete desegregation would be acceptable if a school board could "establish that such time is necessary in the public
interest."30
In 1964, the Court served notice in Griffin v. County School Board of
Prince Edward County"' that there was no longer a need for such delays:
The time for mere "deliberate speed" has run out, and that phrase can no
longer justify denying these Prince Edward County school children their
constitutional rights to an education equal
to that afforded by the public
32
schools in the other parts of Virginia.
Four years later, in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County,"3 the
Court ordered that desegregation take place immediately: "The burden on a
school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to
work, and promises realistically to work now."34
Techniques to ensure desegregation were outlined in the 1971 Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education case. 5 The Court approved "a
frank-and sometimes drastic-gerrymandering of school districts and attendance zones ... [which may be] ...neither compact nor contiguous; indeed
they may be on the opposite ends of the city."3 8 Swann also validated pairing,
clustering, or grouping of schools with attendance assignments made deliberately
to accomplish the transfer of black students out of formerly segregated black
schools and transfer of white students to formerly all-black schools.37 The
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

347 U.S. at 495.
Id. at 494.
See Brown H.
Id. at 300.
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Id. at 234.
391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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Court noted that busing of students is "a normal and accepted tool of educational policy..., 3 s and added that "[d]esegregation plans cannot be limited to
the walk-in school."3 9 A refusal to bus could be valid only "when the time or
distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational process." 4
The thrust was clear, but was it implemented? In the fall of 1964, only
2.14 percent of black public school students in 11 southern states-63,890
Blacks out of a total of almost three million-were attending public elementary
and secondary schools with Whites 1 In 1970, only one-third of black public
school students attended schools whose student bodies were more than half
White. 2 In 1972, 63.7 percent of black students still attended schools whose
student bodies were composed primarily of minority students.43 In the 11 southern states, where the efforts to desegregate have been greatest, 53.7 percent
of black public school students in 1972 were in schools where minority groups
were a numerical majority."
The segregation of Spanish-surnamed Americans is as serious. In the continental United States in 1972, 56.5 percent of Spanish-surnamed students
attended minority schools.4 5 In addition, Spanish-surnamed children all too
often are placed in educable mentally retarded (EMR) classes, when in fact
the source of their difficulty is the language barrier, not a limited learning capacity. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that often they and Indians are
prohibited from speaking in their native tongue while in school. The resulting
enforced silence inevitably breeds frustration and resentment. The implied denigration of a child's own culture, of the language learned from his parents, invariably damages self-esteem. It is not difficult to understand why only six of ten
Chicanos finish high school while eight of ten Whites do;4" why of 30,000
Puerto Ricans in Boston in 1970, only seven Puerto Ricans completed high
school."7 Nor is it difficult to comprehend how Indians or Mexican Americans
deprived of their language, driven from their schools by a hostile environment,
feeling like aliens in their own land, unable to compete with the dominant
society because the tools of competition were denied, finally turn in frustration
to crime and violence.
Those who seek to thwart desegregation have proven imaginative, if nothing
else. Standard ploys include filing bogus assurances of compliance, ignoring
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) approved plans which the school
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 30-31.
See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 380 (Dec. 1964).
42 See OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE,
FALL, 1972 RACIAL AND ETHNIC ENROLLMENT IN PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
SCHOOLS, TABLE 2-A (1974).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at TABLE 2-B.
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itself submitted, outright disobedience of court orders, violence, and economic
coercion. For a long time the best known device was the freedom of choice
subterfuge. It has given way to proposed antibusing amendments to the Constitution and the glorification of the neighborhood school, particularly where
housing is segregated and the neighborhood school means maintenance of a dual
school system. The Department of Justice has refused to bring suits promptly
after HEW referrals of recalcitrant school districts, and HEW itself is understaffed and increasingly less willing to demand action.
Segregation has persisted despite legislative enactments, judicial decisions,
and a relatively thorough comprehension of problems and solutions. We know
what is wrong, but we have said far more than we have done to set things right.
This is not a failure of policy alone, but fundamentally a failure of philosophy.
Legislation is postponed because we do not agree on moral imperatives; it is
passed in response more to political pressures than to ethical perceptions; and
then it is unevenly enforced, increasingly evaded, and finally abandoned in all
but name. Sooner or later, self-interest always emerges as the motivating force.
People resist sacrificing some of their privileges to protect the human dignity of
others. They often deny their moral interdependence without even reflecting
on it.
Our greatest task, then, is not to find specific redress for specific denials of
rights. Enough remedies have already been developed, tested, and catalogued.
Instead, our task in civil rights is the same task we must assume in the cause of
human rights in general. It is to shape a consensus among ourselves based on
the human rights tradition-an integrated and common view of our mutual
moral responsibilities, a systematic balance between the wants of one individual
and the rights of another. Our leaders have the duty to lead in this. If they
do not, we will be left with partial progress, crisis attention followed by benign
neglect, expediency instead of ethics. Our aim now must be not only a strong
policy, but a sound philosophy upon which policy can be grounded, a policy
which recognizes our moral interdependence.
IV. The Bureaucratic Barrier
Even assuming that we recognize our interdependence, we may be thwarted
in our attempts to structure our policy accordingly, for between resolution and
solution, between legislation and implementation, lies the bureaucracy. It is
powerful and pervasive, and it limits what the nation can do for any of its
citizens. It is a factor which must be considered in determining whether an
adequate structural framework exists within which to implement policies
grounded in concern for human rights.
Constitutional theory teaches that America has a government of three
separate branches and that in principle we are a democracy, where people have
a voice in deciding this country's fate. In actual fact, however, individual private citizens have little input into ultimate decisions, and even elected officials
participate on only a limited scale in many of the decisions which shape our
lives.
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Who, then, does make those decisions? It is true that a few elected officials
have overall policy-making responsibility, but their focus is essentially macropolitical in the sense that they deal with the larger issues of war and peace and
the direction of domestic policy. But these represent only a tiny fraction of the
thousands of major policy decisions made each day of the year not by elected
officials, but by individuals two, three, and four times removed from anyone
who can legitimately claim a mandate from an electorate. These are the civil
servants, the so-called bureaucrats. What we call them does not matter. What
is crucial is that we recognize their paramount importance in America today.
They make most of the decisions that affect our daily lives. They are, in effect,
a fourth branch of government at the federal, state, and local levels.
A bureaucrat determines which poor families will receive welfare and how
much; whether they will have access to medical care and at what price; what
kind of public housing they will be permitted to live in and how much rent
they will pay; what allowance they will receive for clothing and child care.
A bureaucrat determines whether a jobless worker will receive unemployment
benefits and how much; whether or not he will be referred to manpower training
to learn a new skill, what kind of job he will be trained for and, hence, what
his lifetime income will be.
The poor and the unemployed are not the only citizens whose lives are
affected by bureaucratic decisions. During the recent energy crisis, for example,
bureaucrats determined how gasoline was to be allocated-to which part of the
country and even to which service stations. Bureaucrats decide who may obtain
television and radio licenses from the government and whether employers and
unions are guilty of unfair labor practices. At the state and local levels, the right
of people to engage in professions, services, and businesses is often determined by
boards and commissions composed of appointed rather than elected officials.
Ironically, even admission to the bureaucracy is determined by bureaucrats in
the Civil Service Commission and equivalent state and local merit system
agencies.
Thus, despite constitutional theory, it is the fourth branch of government,
the nonelected bureaucrats, who make most of the important policy decisions.
Yet a recent study of federal, state, and local governments"8 has shown that most
departments and agencies, particularly in their higher paying professional jobs,
are not representative of the populations they serve. For example, although
minorities-Blacks, Spanish Americans, Orientals, and Indians-make up 20
percent of the total federal bureaucracy, they are hardly visible in many departments. 9 In Transportation, they represent 9.6 percent of the work force;5
in Agriculture, 9.7 percent;51 in NASA, 5.2 percent. 2 Moreover, for the
federal government as a whole, minorities are overrepresented in the lowest
grades of service, where they hold more than a quarter of all positions, but
significantly underrepresented in the seven highest grades.
48 See CIVIL SERVICE CommIssIoN,
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While members of minority groups, including women, no longer encounter
legal barriers in pursuing careers in the bureaucracy, they nevertheless must
overcome obstacles. The principal obstacle is the merit system administered by
the Civil Service Commission, which allegedly ensures that only the most qualified applicants will be appointed to federal, state, and local positions.
For the first hundred years of our nation's history, most appointees were
chosen on the basis of political patronage and friendship and such factors as
veterans' status and needs. When the Civil Service reforms were enacted in the
1880s, the drive to remove appointments from the realm of politics led to the
transfer of the power to appoint public servants from the President and Congress
to bureaucratic commissions and boards. The delegation of recruitment, selection, and appointment powers to bureaucratic commissions was consistent with
prevalent notions of economy, efficiency, and neutrality in government. The
development of psychological testing as a means of identifying those believed
most qualified for various public appointments was responsible in part for the
widely held belief that those selected represented the best and the brightest of
available talent.
However, the fact is that merit has not served as the sole basis for selection.
As in the past, political preference is still a factor. Many agencies such as the
military, public health service, and foreign service certify their own personnel.
A great many employees are selected after a review of their education and employment records, and still others are chosen on the basis of written tests, whose
usefulness as an accurate gauge of ability to perform a given job is open to
question.53
In short, the process of selecting bureaucrats today is still distinguished
by the inequitable requirements and provisions associated with it. There are
arbitrary height requirements, which automatically exclude many Mexican
Americans, Orientals, and women from our police, fire and other public services.
There are arbitrary educational and experience provisions which exclude thousands of Americans who could perform adequately in the jobs. Approximately
ten years ago the Civil Service Commission agreed to institute a program of hiring the mentally retarded, and in the first year alone, 10,000 such persons were
hired. Their work proved outstanding. Had the Commission not waived its
education and experience provisions and considered actual ability to perform
the assigned tasks, 10,000 able Americans would have been deprived of the
opportunity to work and better their lives and the Civil Service would have
lost a valuable resource.
To achieve a representative bureaucracy, we must adopt new hiring techniques based on sensitivity to individual potential to contribute. The Supreme
Court decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 4 requires that every government
agency carefully analyze each job to determine what skills it requires. A natural
outgrowth of the decision is that the widest possible recruitment of applicants
in minority communities be undertaken, and that each agency establish goals
and timetables for the employment of minorities and women. Further, to the
53
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maximum extent possible, selection of personnel should be based on tests which
simulate the requirements of the job for which application is made. A typing
test for a typist's job is a good example. Finally, appointment preference should
be given members of minority groups which are underrepresented in the particular agency in those instances in which there are more candidates capable of
performing the work than there are job openings.
We cannot dispense with bureaucracy in the modem world, nor would we
want to, but we can demand that it be responsive. We can insist that it reflect
moral interdependence instead of resisting it and we can insist that it reflect
the composition of society.
V. The Individual Responsibility
In the midst of so many inescapable demands-of so much wrong to be
righted-with a public philosophy to be formed and a bureaucracy to be reformed-we are tempted to the despair Robert Kennedy assailed a decade ago:
"the belief that there is nothing one man or one woman can do against the vast
array of the world's ills . . . against misery and ignorance, injustice and vio-

lence."55 So we are tempted to futility, to surrender to the sense that we are
not able, so why should we try. In recent years we have lost a President who
inspired us, waged a war which dishonored us, witnessed a reign of violence in
our politics, and, finally, we watched a President desperately seek to stay
in the White House in order that he could stay out of jail. We decided to end
the poverty of the other America, but it is still with us. We planted the seeds
of a Great Society, but then our plowshares were beaten into swords. In whatever direction we have sought to bend history, history seems to have moved the
other way.
So the danger of futility tempts us to retreat from responsibility. And there
we confront the danger of comfort. Many of us are fortunate that we can spurn
Bonhoeffer's command that we must live for others as well as ourselves.5 1 Their
plight may not often touch us directly. And there are signs that even in our
colleges, not long ago a conscience to the nation, comfort has replaced concern.
Yet one man and one woman can make a difference. The setbacks of our
time are balanced by advances, some in our times and others throughout history.
And it is not just the great who change the course of events, or just great tasks
which must be done. A human rights philosophy can be exemplified as well as
explored, acted upon as well as advocated. It can be shaped by our deeds as
well as our words. Indeed, it can become the faith of the nation and the world
only if it is followed in individual lives.
Futility and comfort are an escape, not merely from responsibility, but
from the reality of our own power to dedicate our existence to the principles of
moral interdependence. That is what a black lady named Rosa Parks did
when she refused to move to the back of the bus; what James Meredith did
when he applied to the University of Mississippi; what Ralph Nader did when
55 Address by Senator Robert F. Kennedy, Capetown, South Africa, June 6, 1966.
56 See generally D. BONHOEFFER, ETHICS (6th ed. N. Smith transl. 1970).
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he stood as one man alone against the largest manufacturing corporation in
the world; what two reporters for the Washington Post did when they found the
truth and told it.
Often the man or woman who makes a difference, great or small, does not
set out to be important, but to be right. Alexander Solzhenitsyn did not worry
about being a great Stalinist or winning a Nobel Prize for being a great antiStalinist. His purpose was to be a moral man. He teaches us the lesson of his
life in these words:
Simple is the answer of the ordinary courageous human being who will not
participate in the lie, or support false actions. What his stand says is: "So
be it that this takes place in the world, that it even reigns in the world, but
let it not be with my complicity." 57
Others less famous have refused their complicity, and so must you. What
specifically can you do, as citizens and as lawyers? First, as I have suggested, you
need to develop a moral philosophy which sees your neighbors' or fellow citizens'
problems as your own. Technical skill or knowledge is not enough. You need
to be willing to act and in your actions to treat others as you would like to be
treated under similar circumstances. You would not want to be assaulted or
tortured, to be lied about or spied upon, to be denied the opportunity to make
a living merely because of your sex or your race. You should not say that you
will do to others as they do to you, but rather, that you will do to others as you
wish them to do to you. The difference between those two statements is the
difference between the world as it is and world as it should be.
Second, in addition to developing a moral philosophy that deals with every
other human being as if he were created in your image, you need to set your
goals, both individual and societal, in terms of ideal standards. No society in
history has ever achieved maximum freedom. The entire history of human
existence on this planet is a story of struggle against repression and for liberty.
Yehezkel Dror points out in his book, Public Policy-Making Reexamined,"8
that there are seven different ways to measure governmental performance of
societal achievements. Comparing ourselves with past or currently existing
societies are two of them. A third method, the one traditionally used in the
United States, is to plan programs and to measure achievement in terms of
survival, or "muddling through," making small improvements in existing programs or activities. None of these comparisons is good enough. You should
not be satisfied with how far we have come from some past time, how much
progress we have made, nor should you be satisfied that we in this country are
better off than the people of some other nations. We may not always attain our
ideals, but we should not strive for anything less. Andrei Sakharov reminds us:
"You always have to be aware of [ideals], even if there is no direct path to their
realization. Were there no ideals, there would be no hope whatsoever. Then
everything would be hopelessness, darkness-a blind alley."5 9 Some of you can
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seek elective office, and, if successful, seek to practice as a direct representative
of the people the moral philosophy you have set for yourselves and for society.
Or you can seek judicial office, where you can confront injustice in individual
cases and treat those before you in the way you would like to be treated as a
defendant.

But most of you, I suspect, will practice law, fulfilling your responsibilities
outside elective or judicial office. If you enter private practice, I hope that you
will spend all or some of your time representing the poor and the oppressed. I
hope you will also practice citizenship, using your legal talents outside the office,
in community organizations, in the political parties, on school boards, and in a
host of voluntary agencies.
Finally, while there is a role for lawyers in elective and judicial office and
in activities outside of government, I hope that many of you will consider a
career in the bureaucracy. I realize that it is not popular in this time of Watergate scandals and horrors to urge young people to enter government. You have
heard one of the Watergate defendants urge you to stay away. I urge you instead to join in-to grasp the chance to change our society. A few lawyers and
judges were responsible for Brown v. Board of Education.60 It did not end segregation, but it was an indispensable beginning. And a bureaucratic decision by
a few men at HEW could achieve integration of school systems throughout
America virtually overnight. The bureaucracy can move America.
Not everything you can do will be glamorous; not all of you can be great;
but each of you can make a difference. What is important is not the position
you achieve, but the conscience and the consciousness you bring to it. For in a
thousand different ways, as lawyers and as citizens, you can serve the cause of
moral interdependence.
VI. Conclusion
In his new book, The Gulag Archipelago,6 Alexander Solzhenitsyn has told

the world the truth about the Soviet system of repression. Yet, as we stand with
Solzhenitsyn, we must also understand a deeper truth. The Gulag Archipelago
is not a piece of geography, but a global condition. Political prisoners are exiled
to the Gulag Archipelago of torture in Bolivia and Brazil and, formerly, in
Greece. Millions of Blacks inhabit the Gulag Archipelago of apartheid in South
Africa. Thousands die each month on the Gulag Archipelago of starvation in
India. The Gulag Archipelago surrounds us-and the hard truth is that it also
exists among us.
The Gulag Archipelagos of America are not as harsh as a Siberian labor
camp or a Bihari refugee center. But the relative nature of our shortcomings
does not excuse the absolute reality of the suffering they inflict. Here in our
own country, we have allowed the desperate isolation of the urban ghetto, the
lonely poverty of Indian reservations, and the corruption of government which
commits crimes and then covers up.
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The Gulag Archipelago takes different forms in different lands. But there
is a common path to that place in every land. It is the path of official injusticeit is injustice in the name of justice. The injustice of Solzhenitsyn's exile was
ratified by the rules of Soviet law. Saigon's jails are filled with dissenters according to the law and the forms of Vietnamese justice. Reporters' telephones are
tapped in America in the name of national security and with the support of
the Department of Justice.
Yet our condition is different in another, happier sense. As much as any
nation in the world, and more than most, we still have the capacity to correct
wrongs that have been committed, to widen the writ and the reality of liberty.
For we still have freedom to choose and forums in which to express our choice
and we still profess the ideals which inspired our forebearers to revolt against
injustice and to write into our Constitution a promise to establish justice.
Those ideals are in the human rights tradition. By drawing upon them
now to develop a coherent philosophy of rights, by guiding policy in civil rights
and in the bureaucracy by that philosophy, by exemplifying it in our own lives,
we can find the way to escape the Gulag Archipelago for ourselves. We can
help to find a way for all the world.
The journey will be difficult; it will not be finished soon. In making it, we
must share the spirit of a Peace Corps volunteer I met years ago in Chile. He
was stationed high in the Andes, in a village four hundred miles south of Santiago, and he told me that the people mistrusted him because others like him
had left when the snows came. The only ones who ever stayed were the Communists. I asked him how he would change their minds. He replied: "I'm just
waiting for the snow to come."
If we have the will to work and the patience to wait, then someday these
civil rights lectures will celebrate a nation and a world which, having seen injustice, has corrected it-a nation and a world which have left behind forever
the Gulag Archipelago and achieved in that time and for all time the ancient
vision of peace on earth, good will among men.

